EVENT RECAP

The Science and Politics of Sex and Gender

October 8, 2026  |  Center for the Philosophy of Freedom

Watch the discussion

Watch on YouTube

AUDIENCE Q&A

Written responses to audience questions

The panelists’ written responses to anonymous audience questions are reproduced verbatim below, with their names as provided in the final document.

Select a question to read the responses.

How does the biology of male and female account for intersex people?

Tomas Bogardus:

There are two sexes, male and female. To be male is to have the biological function of producing sperm, and to be female is to have the biological function of producing eggs. And something may have a function without being able to fulfill it. (My eyes, for example, have the function of seeing well, even though they can't do that without eyeglasses.)

In nature, some organisms are only male, some are only female, some are both male and female at the same time (e.g. garden snails and earthworms), and some are neither male nor female (e.g. bacteria). Since there is no third sex, these combinations exhaust the possibilities with regard to sex.

So, people with so-called intersex conditions are either only male, only female, both male and female at the same time, or neither male nor female. I think the answer depends on the condition, and for many conditions the answer is clear. But one needn't know exactly which possibility obtains in order to know that there are only two sexes. (And, personally, I'm skeptical that any human has been a true simultaneous hermaphrodite, or has truly lacked a sex. There are a few alleged cases in the literature, but I don't think they're convincing.)

I will say this about one particular case, namely Swyer Syndrome. During the Q&A, someone asked about this condition. Individuals with Swyer Syndrome have a missing or non-functional copy of the SRY gene, and so fail to complete the virilization process. Typically, the SRY gene initiates a cascade of events resulting in female-appearing genitals changing into male-appearing genitals, the uterus regressing, the undifferentiated gonads developing into testes, etc. This doesn't happen in Swyer Syndrome, and the result is an individual who superficially resembles a female, though with non-functional gonads which never developed into testes. Gonadal dysgenesis, it's called.

It's controversial whether such an individual is male or female. I myself am of the opinion that, since but for the missing or non-functional SRY gene, this individual would have developed testes, this individual does have the function of developing testes, and is therefore male. This function cannot be fulfilled due to the missing or non-functional SRY gene. (If the disorder/syndrome had been remedied, the individual would have been male. So, the body is “trying” to become male, so to speak. So, the function of producing testes is present albeit unfulfilled, and therefore the individual is male.) But other biologists and philosophers judge the case differently, and, I think, not much turns on the diagnosis, so long as we agree that the options are only: M, F, M&F, or neither.

But another interesting question is: are individuals with Swyer Syndrome men or women? They certainly appear to be women, and can, with a transplanted fertilized egg and hormone treatment, carry a pregnancy to term. Yet they are not female, on my account. So, this looks like a potential counterexample to the claim that women are adult human females. I think this is what the questioner was getting at, during the Q&A.

I myself would deny that appearing to be a woman is sufficient to actually be a woman. Womanhood is not a costume, not an appearance, not a set of regularly-and-for-the-most-part behaviors, not a social role. It's possible for a man to appear to be a woman, to regularly and for the most part behave like a woman, and to occupy a social role typical of women, and it's possible for a gender non-conforming woman to flout those appearances, behaviors, and roles. This is enough to show, I think, that womanhood typically lies behind and explains those appearances and behaviors, rather than being identical with those appearances and behaviors. So, I'd doubt that Swyer Syndrome is a counterexample to the claim that women are adult human females. Also, I'll add that our social norms and policies often allow for exceptions, and this seems to me to be a prime candidate for an exception (with regard to, for example, access to sports, prisons, women's shelters, bathrooms, and the like).

Alex Byrne:

An embryo starts to develop into either a male or female one at around 6–8 weeks. The gonads differentiate into testes in a XY embryo, and into ovaries in an XX embryo. It's a complicated process and like every biological process occasionally doesn't work as designed. For instance, an XY fetus might develop with hypospadias, or have aspects of the female phenotype, as in partial androgen insensitivity syndrome; complete androgen insensitivity syndrome is the most dramatic example, which might not be discovered until the person (raised as a girl) reaches puberty. These conditions are not peculiar to humans but occur in other mammals.

"Intersex" is a very misleading term and should be avoided, on my view, since some classic intersex conditions such as congenital adrenal hyperplasia in an XX fetus are uncontroversially not cases of being "between sexes" as the terminology suggests: CAH XX individuals are clearly female. Anyway, the short answer is that the biology of sex development predicts and explains DSDs. Given the sex binary and the way the sexes develop, DSDs are only to be expected.

Carole Hooven:

I take this to mean something like: if there are only two sexes, then where do intersex people fit in? People who are “intersex,” or, more precisely, people with differences in sex development (DSDs), are not an additional sex, but their sex may be less obvious. Sex is defined by which type of gamete, sperm or eggs, the body is organized to produce. There are only two types, so there are only two sexes. People with DSDs may have some sex-related traits more typical of the opposite sex, but in nearly all cases they are clearly male or female. For some people with DSDs, how to classify their sex for legal or other social purposes may not be straightforward, and this can be difficult for people living with such conditions. So of course such decisions should be made in light of the relevant facts, and with compassion and consideration of health, fairness and safety for all.

What are each panelist's views on gender, how 1:1 should it be with sex, and what are the views on subsequent actual issues like self-identification and bathrooms?

Tomas Bogardus:

As far as I can tell, the word “gender” means different things in different contexts. (The word “set” is a good example of this kind of rampant ambiguity: I set down the book; You study set theory; She won the first set.) So I’m not sure exactly what thought the questioner is thinking when he or she wonders “how 1:1 should [gender] be with sex.” Some clarification is needed.

I suspect the questioner is wondering what sort of policies I’d recommend with regard to sex-segregated spaces. I believe there should be some female-only spaces and activities, e.g. prisons, women’s shelters, and sports. And I suppose whether any exception should be made to that kind of policy depends on the purpose of the sex-segregation policy. With sports, for example, sex segregation is a means to achieve safety and fairness. (The same goes, in certain sports, with weight and age divisions.) In that case–and this is speculative–I’d think that certain exceptions could reasonably be made for males who have had no benefit of male puberty, and therefore do not threaten the safety or fairness of the female-only division, e.g. males with CAIS or Swyer Syndrome. Fortunately for me, I’m not in the business of that kind of thorny casuistry, and I’m happy to defer to the relevant authorities (though I reserve the human right to raise objections).

Alex Byrne:

I think by "gender" the questioner means man, woman, boy and girl. If this is right, then (in  my view) gender can't completely come apart from sex, since there are no female men or male girls, etc. Of course, by itself this has no implications for bathroom use or anything like that. Still, having some female-only spaces seems reasonable to me, although this should be "a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim," as the UK Equality Act puts it. Prisons, shelters for abused women, and (many) sports  are among the more compelling examples where female-only spaces are justified.

Carole Hooven:

Here I’ll assume that by “gender,” the questioner means the sex with which someone identifies. In that case, the two are not “1:1.” Sex is a biological reality that exists independently of someone’s feelings about it. That does not mean sex is irrelevant to how one feels. If, for example, a male is uncomfortable with the social expectations for men, or feels “like a woman,” whatever that means in a particular society, he might want to inhabit a female social role. He may then want access to traditionally female spaces, and the same legal rights as a woman.

As I said during the panel, there are two sexes, and mammals cannot change sex. Since no one can change their sex, even by changing how they present, their hormones, or their body, the question becomes how we accommodate people who wish to be regarded as the opposite sex in law and society.

These issues should be decided democratically, and that process must start with shared facts and language: there are two sexes, male and female; one’s sex is immutable; and women are most often the victims of sexual assault, men most often the perpetrators.

While transgender people should, of course, have the same rights as everyone else, and be free to identify socially as they please, there is a clash of rights when self-identification is a ticket into spaces and rights traditionally reserved for the opposite sex. For women in particular, issues of safety, privacy and fairness should be addressed.

We should also recognize that there are rare cases that require special consideration, including some DSDs, like Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (CAIS). People with CAIS have XY chromosomes and internal testes, but their cells can’t respond to testosterone, so they look and behave like typical females from birth. In cases such as these, and perhaps others, people should be considered female for social and legal purposes. It’s important to be able to discuss such issues openly, starting with basic facts, so we can create reasonable policies where rights clash.

What empirical evidence would change your mind about whether it is socially beneficial to recognize transgender people's gender identities?

Tomas Bogardus:

I suppose just the typical empirical evidence one looks to when deciding whether any policy is socially beneficial, e.g. things like controlled trials, qualitative studies, cost-benefit analyses, etc. But I suppose I'd add the caveat that happiness is a slippery thing, and that self-reports about one's own happiness may well be misleading, due to things like cognitive biases, cultural influences, and common misunderstandings of what happiness is. So, that a person reports being happy is certainly evidence that he or she is, but it's not absolutely conclusive evidence.

Alex Byrne:

If it turned out that indulging in a trans man's effort to live socially as a male had long-term negative mental health effects on the person, and that the use of feminine pronouns and whatnot, although hurtful at first, led to later flourishing and self-acceptance, then that would change my mind in favor of “misgendering.”

Carole Hooven:

If this means treating people as the sex they say they are, or want to be, in society and law, then the evidence I would need is that there are no meaningful differences between the sexes in the first place, or that the differences that do exist somehow disappear in people who say they are trans or who have medically transitioned. I often use people’s preferred pronouns in private social situations, like when talking with a parent about how their trans child is doing. But when it comes to data collection on health, safety, behavior, the law, and so on, we do the public, and trans people themselves, a disservice by “recognizing” a person’s preferred sex rather than their actual one. I could be persuaded otherwise, but I’m not sure what kind of “empirical evidence” would do the trick.

What are your thoughts regarding intersex individuals in the context of biological classification?

Tomas Bogardus:

I'd refer this questioner to the answers I've given in two other places.

Alex Byrne:

Please see my answer to the first question.

Carole Hooven:

In more than 99.99% of cases, one’s sex is clear, but there are extremely rare cases in which it is not. In law, sports, and access to female spaces, these cases should be considered individually. For health, what matters is a person’s condition and getting them the support they need.

For Carole Hooven: You mentioned using people's pronouns to avoid hurting feelings. Would this extend to calling Kim Jong Un the supreme leader, and if not, why?

Carole Hooven:

As I mentioned above, I will use preferred pronouns in many situations, but I also understand why others do not. Politeness has limits, and sometimes sex matters more than politeness. I won’t call a dictator “Supreme Leader,” nor would I call a “trans woman” who murdered a woman “she.” I try to refrain from using preferred pronouns in cases where one’s sex is relevant to public policy, or when failing to be clear about one’s sex would mislead the public or increase harm to women in particular.

Do you think the discussion on transgender women in women's sports hurts transgender movements more than it helps, and how can centrists and right-wing people be made sympathetic to basic transgender rights?

Tomas Bogardus:

Yes, I think the attention paid to men in women's sports has frustrated trans activism. I myself had thought the tipping point would involve what's happening with men in women's prisons. But in retrospect I suppose one could have predicted that sports would be a more likely wedge issue, given how common and visible sports are in our culture.

I'd think centrists and right-wing folks are already sympathetic to trans individuals as humans. You asked how they might be made sympathetic to trans rights, but I suppose that would depend on what you have in mind.

Alex Byrne:

Yes to the first part about sports. Transgender people are just people, and (these days) have the same rights against discrimination etc. as everyone else. They can marry whom they choose. All that's to be celebrated. Not framing the issue in terms of "trans rights" would help a lot. In practice, the demand for "trans rights" has included alleged rights to medical treatment of doubtful effectiveness, the right to play in the sex-segregated sports league of one's choice, etc. There are no such rights.

Carole Hooven:

Yes. Pushing for males to compete in female sports is creating a backlash against trans people who are just trying to live their lives. The science is clear, and many girls and women who oppose allowing males into female sport have been bullied, often into silence, by some vocal trans activists. This is not only terrible PR for trans rights, it's a terrible way to treat those who have reasonable concerns about this issue.

It seems that centrists are already sympathetic to “basic trans rights,” if that means being safe from discrimination and having the opportunity to live full lives with dignity and good health, etc. In my view, it does not mean being able to access every space and be treated exactly like a member of the opposite sex.

If categories exist to help humans understand the world rather than humans existing to satisfy categories, why treat the definition of woman as something that must be settled before deciding how to treat transgender people?

Tomas Bogardus:

Whether categories precede humans depends on what categories are. I myself think that term "categories" is more trouble than its worth, and is best avoided. Sometimes people use it to refer to mental or linguistic things that humans invented. Others like Aristotle seem to think of categories as extralinguistic, which we discovered rather than invented. Only the author of this question can tell us which of those he or she meant by "categories."

As to why we might want a definition of womanhood before deciding how to treat trans individuals, well, I suppose the answer is that the latter often depends on the former. We segregate our society in many ways, creating separate spaces for criminals, for children, for employees, for citizens, for paid ticket-holders, etc. etc. And important parts of our society segregate men and women. So, how we treat trans-identifying individuals will depend a lot on whether they are in fact men or women.

One can understand why, at a sports meet, we might first want to establish a competitor's age and weight, say, before deciding "how to treat him or her," i.e. which division to put the person in. In a similar way, it makes sense that we might like to first establish whether a person is a man or a woman before deciding which prison, or sports league, or bathroom, or shelter to allow the person access to. Exceptions might be made, as they are occasionally made in sports. But as to the general policy, that's why it exists, as far as I can tell.

Alex Byrne:

I don't agree that we have to settle the definition of "woman" before deciding how to treat trans people. Behind the question is something like this: Do we have to settle whether trans women are women before deciding whether to treat them (in all, most, or some) contexts as women? I don't think so. Example: we don't have to settle whether trans men are men before deciding whether to allow them to play in the men's golf tournament. (Sure they can, why not?) Imagine someone who is 50 feet tall, and looks very much like a (very tall) woman. (Attack of the 50 Foot Woman is an old scifi/horror movie.) Do we have to settle whether this person is literally a woman before deciding whether to allow her to play in the WNBA? No. Even if she is a woman, she shouldn’t be allowed to play (not even in the NBA). That would ruin the game for everyone else.

Carole Hooven:

I’ll leave this to the philosophers.

What are your views on the issue of transgender women in women's sports and its adverse effect on progressive movements in general?

Tomas Bogardus:

I'd refer this questioner to the answer I gave previously regarding women’s sports.

Alex Byrne:

See my answer to the above question about transgender women in women's sport.

Carole Hooven:

Answered above.

If biological sex is considered binary, how do you account for intersex people, such as those who possess characteristics of both sexes?

Tomas Bogardus:

To say that biological sex is binary is, I think, to say that there are exactly two sexes, and that they stand in a certain sort of relationship of contrast and complementarity that's characteristic of binary oppositions like day/night, sacred/profane, introvert/extrovert, etc. And I do think biological sex is binary in just this way.

How do I account for intersex people, especially those who possess characteristics of both sexes? Well, I suppose the first thing to say is that a sex is not a bundle of characteristics, such that no single characteristic is necessary, but if one has enough of the bundle, then one belongs to that sex. That may well be a psychological explanation of how and why we apply our sex terms, namely that we look for typical indicators of a sex. We might check hair length, gait, dress, vocal pitch, or even a driver's license in order to apply the term 'male' or 'female' to a person.

But what these characteristics actually indicate is something deeper, something shared across the plant and animal kingdoms. Not every male has short hair; many have no hair at all. Many males have no gait, no clothing, no voice, and even no driver's license. Think of a male mulberry tree, for example. When one considers what all the many males have in common that makes them male, I believe one will arrive at the conclusion that being male is a functional property, just as being a mousetrap, being a quarterback, and being money are functional properties. And the function is that of producing sperm. Similarly with females, though with ova.

So, the fact that some males possess characteristics typical of females--long hair, say, or an 'F' on a driver's license--does not mean the person is partly female. And the same goes for other, more intimate parts of one's anatomy. The fact that, for some people, the male virilization process was interrupted by an insensitivity to androgens, leading to female-appearing genitalia, does not make these folks partly female, or more female, or anything like that. Any more than the fact that pyrite shares certain features with gold means that pyrite is partly gold.

Individuals with disorders of sexual development are either only male, or only female, or possibly both male and female simultaneously (there are many organisms that do this), or neither male nor female (again, there are many organisms without a sex). Those are the possibilities, I'd say. And while it may be difficult to know in some particular cases which of those possibilities obtains, nevertheless those are the only options, since there are only two sexes.

As to why there are only two sexes, well, if a sex is the function of producing a certain type of gamete (an anisogamous gamete, as biologists say), and there are only two types of those (sperm and eggs), then there are only two sexes.

Lastly, you may wonder how sex could be binary if some organisms (e.g. garden snails and earthworms) are both male and female simultaneously. Binaries require mutual exclusion, one might think. But I believe that if you consider the full range of pairs that are often called binaries, you'll realize that it's not essential to the idea of a binary that the components be mutually exclusive. Introversion and extroversion are said to be a binary opposition, but ambiverts are both introverted and extroverted. (In ambiverts, these dispositions are realized in different contexts.) Fiction and non-fiction are said to be a binary opposition, but one book (and even one sentence) can feature both fiction and also non-fiction. Even with regard to binary code, though each bit must be either 1 or 0 (never both), one computer program can feature both 1s and 0s, in virtue of having many bits. In a similar way, one organism might feature both maleness and femaleness, in virtue of having two sexes. But, for any sex you choose, it's either male or female, never both, and never neither. And that's why I think disorders of sexual development are compatible with the claim that sex is binary: for any sex had by such an individual, that sex is either male or female, not both, and not neither. (N.B., it’s possible that such an individual has no sex, or has both sexes.)

Alex Byrne:

Please see my answer to the first question. Men with gynecomastia have breasts that look more like female breasts than male breasts, but for all that they are definitely male, not partly female or anything like that.

Carole Hooven:

See my answer to the first question.

View the original event page