2018-2019

A talk by Eric Gibson, the Arts in Review editor of The Wall Street Journal, is presented by the Center for the Philosophy of Freedom in conjunction with the American Culture & Ideas Initiative.

Abstract:
Among its many revolutions, the digital age has altered our relationship to visual information -- how we take it in and process it, as well as our expectations of it. What are the consequences of this for the experience and understanding of art?

Where: ILC 120
When: Tuesday October 30th 5:15pm

Eric Gibson is the arts in review editor of The Wall Street Journal, overseeing the opinion side of the paper’s cultural coverage—its criticism of the fine arts, television, movies, theater and the many forms of popular music. He also writes art exhibition reviews and op-eds on issues in the world of museums.

When

5:15 p.m. Oct. 30, 2018

Academic year

2018-2019

Semester

Fall

Where

ILC 120

Aristotelian Statecraft

Thu, 10/18/2018 - 12:30 to 13:45

Location: Social Scienes 128

Abstract:
Is Aristotle’s theory of statecraft relevant to modern politics?  It would seem not, since Aristotle contends that the proper aim of government is the promotion of virtue (as he understands it) and his own “best constitution” involves many features that appear highly illiberal to moderns (including slavery, political disenfranchisement of women, and various restrictions on individual freedom).  Miller argues, however, that Aristotle’s political theory includes a general theory of statecraft which can be separated from his own view of the purpose of government.  This Aristotelian statecraft represents a “middle way” between Platonic utopianism and Machieavellian Realpolitik.  Aristotle’s theory can offer practical guidance even to those who espouse political ideals very different from his own, including even an advocate of the libertarian minimal state.
 

We welcome faculty, students, and staff of the Philosophy and Moral Science Departments as well as members of the wider University community.

When

12:30 p.m. Oct. 18, 2018

Academic year

2018-2019

Semester

Fall

Plato and the Ship of State

Tues., 10/16/2018 - 12:30 to 13:45

Location: Social Sciences 128

Abstract:
Plato introduces the famous Ship of State simile (Rep. VI.488a7-489a6) to explain why true philosophers are not honored in cities. He claims that a true philosopher in a polis like Athens is like a skilled but disrespected steersman aboard a ship that has been high-jacked by its unruly crew and whose helm has been placed in the hands of a sailor who knows nothing about steering. If Plato regards a ship with an unruly crew and an incompetent steersman as a good image of Athenian democracy, then by extension he must regard a ship with an orderly crew and a competent steersman as a good image of a well-governed polis. These two parts of the simile, the high-jacked ship and the orderly ship, relate to each other as do the two parts of the more famous Cave simile, a fire-lit region inside a cave and a sun-lit region outside. In both similes the unusual or abnormal symbolizes the normal, and the normal in turn symbolizes the ideal. As a fire-lit region inside a cave symbolizes the sensible realm of ordinary objects (and their images), a high-jacked ship symbolizes Athenian democracy; and as a sunlit region outside a cave symbolizes the intelligible realm of Platonic Forms, a competently managed ship symbolizes Plato’s ideal polis. Just as the one simile encapsulates Plato’s metaphysics, the other encapsulates his political philosophy. The Ship of State simile differs from the Cave simile, however, in being not only an analogy, but an argument from analogy. So it is worth considering the important disanalogies between a competently managed ship and Plato’s ideal polis, of which there are at least two. The selection of a steersman and, once selected, the basis of his authority differ importantly from the selection of a true philosopher-king and the basis of his authority.

We welcome faculty, students, and staff of the Philosophy and Moral Science Departments as well as members of the wider University community.

When

12:30 p.m. Oct. 16, 2018

Academic year

2018-2019

Semester

Fall

When Do Unhealthy States Harm the One Who is Unhealthy?

Thu, 11/15/2018 - 12:30 to 13:45

Location: Social Sciences 128

Abstract:
What is the relation between health and well-being? While healthy states may possess intrinsic and instrumental value for the subject in such states, the relation between health and well-being also appears to be a contingent one. If that is correct, then the following question arises: when do unhealthy states harm the one in that state? This talk introduces a new counter-factual account of the harmfulness of unhealthy states.

We welcome faculty, students, and staff of the Philosophy and Moral Science Departments as well as members of the wider University community.

When

12:30 p.m. Nov. 15, 2018

Academic year

2018-2019

Semester

Fall

Topic: The Four Faces of Misogyny

Thu, 09/13/2018 - 12:30 to 13:45

Location: Social Sciences 128 (Kendrick Room)

Abstract:

Misogyny is often mistaken for a psychological condition, specifically, as the “undifferentiated hatred towards all women.” Rejecting this definition, Kate Manne (2017) has recently argued that misogyny is “the law enforcement branch of a patriarchal order." In other words, misogyny is better understood as a system of constraints that sanction non-compliant women. For Manne, misogyny regulates and produces gender inequalities primarily through punishments. 

In this paper, I argue for an alternative way of identifying and evaluating misogyny, using what I call the four faces of misogyny. The four faces of misogyny are silencing, gender stereotypes, devaluation, and objectification.   

This argument draws on Iris Marion Young’s classic work “The Five Faces of Oppression.” Young recommends understanding oppression (and thereby injustice) by identifying its five faces (violence, marginalization, cultural imperialism, exploitation, and powerlessness). Having experienced any one of these faces of oppression is sufficient for being oppressed.

While Young’s work is an invaluable starting point for naming and identifying oppression, it is also important to update her categories in light of contemporary configurations of injustices as well as certain advancements in political theory.  More specifically, an important insight from the literature on intersectionality is that privileges and disadvantages can be produced simultaneously. In other words, a person can be both advanced and constrained by his or her group membership. As a result, it is important to recognize misogyny not only as a system of punishment but also as a system of rewards to compliant women. Misogyny incentivizes compliance. To help illuminate the connections between complicity and misogyny, I recommend recognizing the four faces of misogyny: silencing, gender stereotypes, devaluation, and objectification. 

We welcome faculty, students, and staff of the Philosophy and Moral Science Departments as well as members of the wider University community.

 

When

12:30 p.m. Sept. 13, 2018

Academic year

2018-2019

Semester

Fall

Social Rules and Personal Plans in Libertarian Thought

Thu, 10/11/2018 - 12:30 to 13:45

Location: Social Sciences 128

Abstract:
Libertarian political philosophy is often associated with a concern for pure principles, particularly those of natural law or a “non-aggression axiom,” as well as with a radicalism exemplified by anarchism. Not all libertarian philosophers are this way, however. This work looks at two prominent libertarian political philosophers, Eric Mack and Loren Lomasky, and the alternative path they took. Despite significant differences in their accounts, Mack and Lomasky each take as foundational conceptions of people as pursuing their own plans in life. Moreover, they recognize that social rules facilitate mutual respect among planners. This mutual respect is compatible with significant variation in possible social rules, leading these authors to accept a range of legitimate possible specifications of rights rather than deriving a priori a unique specification. This, in turn, creates space for states to be one source of legitimate social rules that allow moral agents to plan and let plan.

We welcome faculty, students, and staff of the Philosophy and Moral Science Departments as well as members of the wider University community.

 

When

12:30 p.m. Oct. 11, 2018

Academic year

2018-2019

Semester

Fall

Play Like Me Or Else! Supporting Conformity in Stag Hunt Problems With Costly Punishment

Thu, 11/29/2018 - 12:30 to 13:45

Location: Social Sciences 128

Abstract: The Stag Hunt problem is sometimes proposed as a model of the social contract, where each member of a community can choose either to perform by contributing at some personal cost towards completing a mutually beneficial project or to defect by withholding one’s contribution. I explore the evolution of strategies in Augmented Stag Hunt games that add punishing strategies to the performing and defecting strategies in ordinary Stag Hunt. I consider how the members of a population might tend to adopt norms requiring conforming behavior in Stag Hunts that they enforce via costly pro-social and anti-social punishing behavior. I argue that the effects of pro-social and anti-social punishments depend crucially upon the ability of community members to execute punishment strategies correctly. I also argue that the analysis here lends support to the hypothesis that altruistic punishment can contribute to the formation and maintenance of norms of cooperation in a social contract.

We welcome faculty, students, and staff of the Philosophy and Moral Science Departments as well as members of the wider University community.

When

12:30 p.m. Nov. 29, 2018

Academic year

2018-2019

Semester

Fall

The Logic of Inference of Thought Experiments in Political Philosophy

Thu, 10/25/2018 - 12:30 to 13:45

Location: Social Sciences 128

Abstract: Thought experiments are widely used and widely criticised in political theory. This paper highlights important and largely unnoticed parallels between thought experiments and comparison in the natural and social sciences. This gives us a more precise language with which to assess the strengths and weaknesses of thought experiments. And it gives us powerful tools for improving them, by using ideas like internal and external validity, controlled comparison, omitted variable bias, interaction effects, spurious correlations, testable implications, and parsimony. Focusing on variables is the key. This helps me address longstanding debates about ‘weird’ and ‘wacky’ thought experiments. I do not wish to exaggerate the scientific parallels: there are important differences too. But the similarities raise fascinating questions about the links between political theory and political science, and between philosophy and science more generally.

 

We welcome faculty, students, and staff of the Philosophy and Moral Science Departments as well as members of the wider University community.

When

12:30 p.m. Oct. 25, 2018

Academic year

2018-2019

Semester

Fall

Workshop with Christel Fricke (University of Oslo).

Title: Responsibility.

Location: Maloney Seminar Room, Social Sciences 224.

Schedule

Friday 25 January

3:00 – 5:00      Christel Fricke, Philosophy, University of Oslo

             “Moral conversations: Moderate Blame and Responsibility”

Saturday 26 January

9:00 – 10:30    Hannah Tierney, Philosophy, University of Sydney

“Guilty Confessions”

10:45 – 12:15  Miranda Fricker, Philosophy, City University of New York

“Moral Protagonists”

12:15 – 2:00    Lunch

2:00 – 3:30      Coleen Macnamara, Philosophy, University of California, Riverside

“Standing to Blame”

The Center for the Philosophy of Freedom and the Department of Philosophy at the University of Arizona are pleased to have Christel Fricke from University of Oslo visiting us for the spring 2019 semester. The Fricke Workshop on Responsibility is generously funded by the Center for the Philosophy of Freedom, and it is intended to welcome Professor Fricke by supporting her recent work on moral responsibility.

When

1:30 p.m. Jan. 26, 2019

Academic year

2018-2019

Semester

Spring
Commentators: Christel Fricke

Manuscript workshop with Justin D'Arms (Ohio State University) and Daniel Jacobson (University of Michigan).

Schedule
9:00 – 9:15      Coffee, greetings

9:15 – 10:45    Sarah Stroud, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
                                    “Sentimental Journey: From Sentiments to Values—and Beyond?”
                        Replies by Justin D’Arms, Ohio State University, and Daniel Jacobson, University of Michigan

11:00 – 12:30  Shaun Nichols, University of Arizona
                                    “Fit and Function”
                        Replies by Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson

12:30 – 2:30    Lunch

2:30 – 4:00      Connie Rosati, University of Arizona
                                    “Is ‘Rational Sentimentalism’ an Oxymoron?”
                        Replies by Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson

4:15 – 5:45      Kieran Setiya, M.I.T. 
                                    “Derivation, Integration, Anthropocentrism”
                        Replies by Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson

5:45 – 6:45      Informal Gathering at location nearby

7:00                 Dinner

Organized by Michael McKenna and Steven Wall

* All attendees are asked to read the prepared manuscript by the authors. Please contact Shauna Garland (shaunagarland@email.arizona.edu) to get access to the manuscript and sign up for inclusion in the workshop.

 

When

9 a.m. to 6 p.m. Jan. 19, 2019

Academic year

2018-2019

Semester

Spring
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