2014-2015

When

12:30 p.m. to 1:45 p.m. April 9, 2015

Academic year

2014-2015

Semester

Spring

When

12:30 p.m. to 1:45 p.m. April 30, 2015

Academic year

2014-2015

Semester

Spring

The Intrinsic Goods of Childhood: Trust, Time, and Play

Abstract:

I begin my examination of the goods of children by thinking first about children as rights bearers. If children have rights and those rights protect their welfare, then we need to know in what children’s welfare consists. On a predominant view of welfare-so mainstream as to pass by unnoticed—only the welfare of adults counts and we measure childhood goods by their contribution to adult life. For example, health care decisions for children are often justified on the basis of future health and well-being, discounting rather heavily impact on current well-being. As well, policies around education and school curriculum focus on producing competent adult workers and citizens often ignoring childhood. Discussions of corporal punishment and its justification often ask, “But does it work?” focusing entirely on outcomes setting aside its effects on childhood well-being.

But what if there are goods the value of which doesn’t follow from their contribution to the goods of adult life? Then these lines of justification and argument will be missing out on a morally significant factor. In many cases the results may be the same, but getting the reasons right matters. Good childhoods will produce good adults but as the examples I’ve given just show it does make a practical difference that we get it right. For example, we need to know the relative weight of instrumental goods and intrinsic goods. Consider the tough question of providing for our children sufficient opportunities to experience some bads, failure, for example, in order to produce resilient competent goods.

Are any of the intrinsic goods of childhood uniquely available to children? I suggest that play, trust, and time might be such goods. And here I consider these three goods as unique childhood goods. A final section of the paper considers three objections: First, that these goods aren’t unique to childhood. Second, that they are only instrumentally good. And third, that they are not necessarily good at all.

When

12:30 p.m. to 1:45 p.m. Feb. 12, 2015

Academic year

2014-2015

Semester

Spring

"Do non-evidential considerations constrain rational belief?"

When

12:30 p.m. to 1:45 p.m. April 16, 2015

Academic year

2014-2015

Semester

Spring

"Acts, Attitudes, and Rational Choice."

On February 26th, Doug Portmore will be giving a talk as part of the Freedom Center Colloquium Series. Please join us in the Kendrick Room at the Freedom Center for Professor Portmore's talk!

Abstract:

I argue that we have obligations not only to perform certain actions, but also to form certain attitudes (such as desires, beliefs, and intentions), and this despite the fact that we rarely, if ever, have direct voluntary control over our attitudes. Moreover, I argue that whatever obligations we have with respect to our actions derive from our obligations with respect to our attitudes. More specifically, I argue that an agent is obliged to perform an act if and only if it’s the act that she would perform if she were to form the attitudes that she’s obliged to form. This view, which I call attitudism, has three important implications. First, it implies that an adequate practical theory must not be exclusively act-orientated. That is, it must require more from us than just the performance of certain voluntary acts. Additionally, it must require us to (involuntarily) form certain attitudes. Second, it implies that an adequate practical theory must be attitude-dependent. That is, it must hold that which acts we’re required to perform depends on which attitudes we’re required to form. Third, it implies that an adequate practical theory can’t require us to perform acts that we would not perform even if we were to form the attitudes that we’re obliged to form. I then show how these implications can help us both to address certain puzzling cases of rational choice and to understand why most typical practical theories (utilitarianism, virtue ethics, rational egoism, Rossian deontology, etc.) are mistaken.

When

12:30 p.m. to 1:45 p.m. Feb. 26, 2015

Academic year

2014-2015

Contentment

On January 22nd, Cheshire Calhoun will be giving a talk as part of the Freedom Center Colloquium Series. Calhoun is a professor of philosophy at Arizona State University, a research professor at the Center, and president of the American Philosophical Association. One notable member of the Arizona faculty described Calhoun as one of the 10 most insightful living philosophers. Please join us in the Kendrick Room at the Freedom Center for Professor Fodeman’s talk!

When

12:30 p.m. to 1:45 p.m. Jan. 22, 2015

Academic year

2014-2015

Semester

Spring

The next SPP conference is called the "Morality of Aggression" and it will take place in Tucson from December 4-7. Participants will explore broad questions on the morality of aggression including, but not limited to, competition, cooperation, and aggression; the libertarian non-aggression principle; just war and humanitarian intervention; the moral limits of legal coercion; paternalism and perfectionism; the moral (non-)neutrality of the concept of harm; and the conditions for the permissibility of self-defense.

The speakers will be:

Cristina Bicchieri, SJP Harvie Professor of Social Thought and Comparative  Ethics, University of Pennsylvania

Jason Brennan, Assistant Professor, Georgetown University
 
Samantha Brennan, Professor, University of Western Ontario
 
Claire Finkelstein, Algernon Biddle Professor of Law and Prof. of Philosophy,  University of Pennsylvania Law School
 
Heidi Hurd, David C. Baum Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, University of Illinois
 
Frances Kamm, Littauer Professor of Philosophy & Public Policy, Harvard  University
 
Hartmut Kliemt, Professor, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management
 
Eric Mack, Professor, The Murphy Institute, Tulane University
 
Michael Moore, Charles R. Walgreen, Jr. Chair, University of Illinois
 
Horacio Spector, Professor, University of San Diego School of Law and Universidad Torcuato di Tella, Argentina
 
Bas Van Der Vossen, Assistant Professor, University of North Carolina, Greensboro
 
Steve Wall, Professor, University of Arizona
 
Matt Zwolinski, Associate Professor, University of San Diego

When

9 a.m. Dec. 4, 2014 to 5 p.m. Dec. 7, 2014

Academic year

2014-2015

Semester

Fall

The Center for the Philosophy of Freedom is happy to be hosting a workshop at Loews Ventana Canyon Resort in celebration of the new Oxford Handbook of Freedom, edited by David Schmidtz and published by Oxford University Press. We are fortunate to have a distinguished group of political philosophers presenting papers. They include: Richard Arneson (UC San Diego), Mark Budolfson (Princeton), Jerry Gaus (Arizona), Ryan Hanley (Marquette), David Keyt (Washington), Fred Miller (Bowling Green), Eddy Nahmias (Georgia State), Mark Pennington (King’s College, London), and David Sobel (Syracuse).

A schedule of presentations and information about the speakers can be found here. If you would like to attend, please register by emailing Stephen Stich at stich@email.arizona.edu.

 

When

6 p.m. Oct. 9, 2014 to 7:15 p.m. Oct. 11, 2014

Academic year

2014-2015

Semester

Fall

"Meritocracy, Equality of Opportunity, and Social Cohesion. Pick Two."

On November 6th, Ryan Muldoon will be giving a talk as part of the Freedom Center Colloquium Series. Muldoon is a Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy, Politics and Economics at the University of Pennsylvania. Please join us in the Kendrick Room at the Freedom Center for Dr. Muldoon’s talk!

More details about Dr. Muldoon can be found here:

http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~rmuldoon/Ryan_Muldoon/Welcome.html

Abstract:

"A variety of liberal theories share a belief in the importance of several political desiderata.  Meritocracy has near universal support, both as a practical method of distributing resources, prestige and office, and as a moral claim about who is deserving of the social surplus that we generate.  Likewise, the equality of opportunity is embraced both as a means of ensuring fairness, but also as a justificatory support for unequal distribution.  When paired with meritocracy, we can argue that unequal rewards are directly tied to unequal effort and skill.  Finally, though liberal theories may tolerate social divisions, they tend to value social cohesion: a shared set of values and practices that provide the background framework for supporting a system of social cooperation.  I argue that these three desiderata, though each individually desirable, cannot be mutually satisfied.  In particular, I argue that meritocratic systems that are socially cohesive will result in a matthew effect, generating outsized rewards for small differences.  This undermines the equality of opportunity.  I argue that the best resolution to this trilemma is to drop social cohesion as a desideratum."

When

12:30 p.m. to 1:45 p.m. Nov. 6, 2014

Academic year

2014-2015

Semester

Fall

Well-Being: Happiness in a Worthwhile Life

Details about Professor Badhwar can be found here:

http://www.ou.edu/ouphil/faculty/badhwar/badhwar.html

Details about her new book, which will be the topic of discussion, can be found here:

http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195323276.0...

Comments will be given on the manuscript from Arizona's very own Julia Annas, Rachana Kamtekar, and Dan Russell.

 

When

10 a.m. March 28, 2015

Academic year

2014-2015

Semester

Spring
Commentators: Julia Annas, Rachana Kamtekar, Dan Russell
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